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Abstract 
 
In 2007 Russian voters elected representatives to the State Duma under new 
electoral procedures that President V. Putin had instituted. A presidential 
election followed in 2008, won by D. Medvedev, leading to Putin’s new role as 
prime minister. To many observers, the reforms and the election campaigns 
resulted in a party system manipulated to the advantage of the government, 
although Putin’s reported goal was to reduce the number of political parties. 
Earlier research [1,2,6] reported that social conformity exerted a strong, 
persistent, and predictable influence on voting in national elections from 1991 
to 2003. This analysis examines how the effect of social conformity on Russian 
voters might have changed from earlier elections as a result of the electoral 
reforms and campaign practices. Specific questions addressed are how well 
the political party system now aligns with the interests of voters, and whether 
this type of analysis can speak to fairness of the elections.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The analysis is based on a predictive mathematical model that captures the 
effect of social conformity on people’s collective social choices [1,2]. The 
model is derived from several principles of conformity [2,3,4]. First is the fact 
that people often align their behavior with the behavior of others or act in 
accord with a widely held social norm. This can depend, however, on whether 
people’s attention is brought to bear on the specific norm or behavior involved. 
Second, when more people are doing something, then others are increasingly 
likely to do the same, although this process is self-limiting as not everyone will 
come into conformity. Third is the principle that people are fairly consistent in 
their degree of collective conformity from one situation to another. Conformity 
is greatly affected by nonconscious cognitive processes. People’s conformity 
with a social norm can occur without their conscious awareness, and they may 
attribute their behavior to other reasons.  
 
Applied to voting behavior, the model of conformity makes the following 
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argument. The social norm that citizens should vote exerts a strong influence 
on behavior, and research indicates this is the primary reason that people vote 
[5]. The great attention given to a national election heightens people’s 
awareness that they should vote and strengthens the effect of the voting norm. 
People are influenced toward voting by how often they expect others to vote 
and for whom. Prospective voters can get this information through informal 
social channels, opinion polls (frequently reported in Russia), and by their 
information as to how others voted in previous elections. The effect of 
conformity on the decision to vote then spills over to a consistent degree 
among many people in their choice of political parties, affecting the distribution 
of votes among the parties or candidates (for a single office). As more people 
decide to vote, following the majority norm, they also are more likely to vote 
for the political parties that most other people are voting for. These principles 
lead to a mathematical model of the relationship between voter turnout and 
the distribution of votes among parties when influenced by social conformity.  
 
The applicability of the model becomes a test for the effect of conformity on 
voting behavior and its degree of influence. Some voters may vote for reasons 
other than social conformity, as predicted by rational-choice voting models, for 
example. But if social conformity has a strong effect on a significant  proportion 
of voters, it will have a unique and predictable impact on the election result—it 
leaves a signature or fingerprint of its effect that one can detect through 
quantitative analysis. It is this model that was demonstrated previously for 
Russian elections [1,2,6] and which also holds strongly in national elections of 
many other countries, including the United States, Germany, Japan, and 
Ukraine, among others [1,2]. 
 
The effect of social conformity on voting has received little attention in voting 
research, which has been dominated by rational-choice theory [7]. Following 
an economic analogy, this theory assumes that people vote because the 
potential gain for themselves outweighs the costs of voting; party choice 
follows the same self-serving logic. This theory has been sharply criticized, 
however, for failing to explain voting behavior [8]. Other explanations for 
voting behavior examine sociological aspects but not specifically conformity. 
Nevertheless, it is well known from the earliest behavioral studies of voting 
that people often vote the same as their families, friends, community, labor 
union, or ethnic group. But this line of research has not sorted out whether in 
these situations people vote like others because of a desire to conform with 
them or because they share a common self-interest with others in their 
affiliated group. Supporting the conformity model more directly is evidence of 
a “bandwagon” effect, when voters increasingly shift their vote to the party 
most likely to win. Also, neighborhood effects that cause people to change 
their vote to be in line with the majority in their neighborhood have been 
reported frequently in Britain [9]. Evidence on political communication further 
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supports that interaction between people affects their voting choice [10], while 
other research shows a strong and consistent relationship between voting 
participation and conformity with other social norms [11,12].  
 
This analysis concerns the Duma election of 2007 and the presidential election 
of 2008. The Duma election was held on December 2, 2007. This was the first 
election in which all voting was for party lists and seats were assigned in 
proportion. Previously, half the seats were assigned by proportional 
representation and half by winner-take-all in electoral districts, but President 
Putin abolished the system of electoral districts. Eleven parties competed in 
2007 after a few others had been ruled ineligible. The threshold for a party to 
gain a seat was 7%, which meant that only four parties won representation in 
parliament. United Russia, which Putin supported, gained 63% of the vote. The 
presidential election was held on March 28, 2008. D. Medvedev, with the 
backing of several political parties, won with 71% of the vote; the remainder 
divided among the other three candidates.  
 
Elaboration of the Conformity Model 
 
Application of the conformity model to an election first requires a measure for 
conformity, but there is no standard measure at hand. If there are only two 
alternatives, it is easy to see which is favored by the majority. When more than 
two alternative choices are involved, or the number can change, it is not 
obvious how to measure conformity. The model builds on the principle of 
conformity that when deciding which of several actions to take, people may 
take into account the relative frequencies or proportions of other people who 
are making these choices. This assumes that people have direct knowledge of 
others’ likely behavior or, at least, a naïve, implicit statistical knowledge about 
the relative frequencies or probabilities of behavior and social categories in 
their society. Psychological research shows, in fact, that people acquire such 
statistical knowledge automatically, without conscious awareness or intent 
[13]. So if people are using such statistical information when making voting 
decisions, one must have a measure for conformity that captures this cognitive 
representation.  
 
Although one might imagine a variety of possible conformity measures based 
on probability information, the Shannon entropy measure [14] of statistical 
information theory is already well known and has clear links to both 
predictability of events and cognitive decision making. The human brain 
responds to changes in event probability in relation to the entropy of the 
situation [15] and has a cognitive limit of about 3 (bits) on the entropy scale 
[16] when it has to discriminate between several alternatives of different 
probabilities. The entropy measure incorporates the idea that more 
unexpected events carry more information. The relationship is a logarithmic 
 4 
function of event probability.  
 
The entropy measure H(S) for a set S of k alternatives of probability p
i
 where 
i = 1, 2, . . . k, and ∑ p
i
 = 1  is H(S) = - ∑ p
i
  log p
i
 with the logarithm to base 
2. As differences between the probabilities increase, entropy decreases; when 
the probabilities tend toward equality, entropy increases. Let p
i  
represent the 
probability of people in an election voting for the i-th party. If voters shift their 
vote to one or two large parties from smaller parties so that p
i
 increase for the 
larger parties, entropy will decrease. Therefore if people are becoming more 
conformist, aligning themselves with larger political party voting groups, the 
entropy of the collective voting decision is decreasing. So entropy is an inverse 
measure of conformity. H(S) is never less than zero and attains its maximum 
when all alternatives are equally probable or p
i
 = 1/k; the maximum is log k. 
(For k = 2, maximum H(S) =1; for k=3, maximum is 1.58; for k = 4, maximum 
is 2, etc.). H(S) = 0 at p = 0 or p = 1. 
 
Entropy or nonconformity in the turnout choice is identified as H(T). One can 
calculate this retrospectively using the fractional turnout rate t,  
 
 H(T) = - t log t – (1-t) log (1-t).  
 
This is shown in Figure 1 where one sees a nearly parabolic relationship 
between H(T) and turnout, having a maximum H(T) = 1 at t = 0.50 when the 
probabilities of voting and abstaining are equal. If the prevalent social norm is 
that people should vote, conformity expresses itself as high turnout above 
50% and closer to 100%. If, however, the norm is to abstain from voting, 
which sometimes happens, conformity implies a very low turnout below 50%. 
One can make a similar calculation for the entropy in the party vote choice 
H(P) using the actual voting share p
i
 received for each party in the election.  
 
The principle that people are fairly consistent in their degree of conformity 
from one choice situation to another implies a positive relationship between 
the two voting entropy measures in an election, that is, between voter turnout 
and the distribution of votes across parties. One can express the idea of 
consistency mathematically and make a more definitive hypothesis as to an 
isomorphic relationship between the two measures. Let us put both entropy 
measures on the same scale by taking the number of choices into account for 
each measure. H(P)/log k and H(T)/log 2 both have range [0,1]. So full 
consistency or agreement between the two measures along the scale implies 
H(P)/log k = H(T)/log 2, which simplifies to H(P) = log k H(T). An immediate 
prediction from this equation is that H(P) must have the same relationship to 
turnout as the parabolic curve in Figure 1, but multiplied by log k. The 
maximum of the H(P) curve is predicted to be at approximately t = 0.50. 
Electoral units of analysis, whether measured over time or cross-sectionally, 
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should be approximately on such a curve when their party entropy is plotted 
against turnout—a relationship that can be tested and estimated with 
regression analysis.  
 
Applicability of the model in an election is indicated by (1) a nearly parabolic 
shape to the relationship of H(P) to t, as in Figure 1; (2) a maximum of H(P) 
near 50% turnout; (3) a ratio of H(P) to H(T) approximately equal to log k, 
when voters perceive k parties competing; and (4) a strong fit of the model to 
election data, indicating a strong consistency in voting conformity across the 
two voting choices. These predictions are a definitive test for a strong presence 
of social conformity in voting because they follow directly and uniquely from a 
conformity theory and are very unlikely to be true if other explanations of 
voting hold [17]. Neither rational choice theory nor any other voting theory 
would make such a general prediction. 
 
Although one can start with the assumption that k should equal the number of 
parties on the ballot, it is usually the situation that the number of parties on the 
ballot does not accurately reflect what voters perceive as their choices. So the 
analysis estimates the number of parties rather than simply counting the 
number on the ballot. Often voters are ignorant of minor parties on the ballot 
and, more generally, not all party choices may register distinctly in voters’ 
cognitive decision making. The number that a person can consider is 
constrained by a person’s short-term or working memory capacity, especially 
when there is little time to make the choice and reflect on information about all 
the parties. And an excessive number of parties will bump against people’s 
cognitive entropy limit on information processing causing errors in 
classification. One might get an estimate of the psychological number of 
parties, for example, by asking voters just after they voted to name quickly the 
parties on the ballot from memory. Time and information constraints on the 
voting decision also make it more likely that a voter’s decision making will fall 
back on a simple heuristic such as the relative sizes of the expected vote for 
the parties.  
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Figure 1. Turnout, entropy, and social conformity.  
 
 
 
Testing and Estimating the Models 
 
Duma election of 2007. The election data is analyzed for 85 regions. The data 
includes voting for 11 parties plus a very small percentage of votes that were 
invalid (average 1% per region); this was counted as an additional voting 
category in the analysis, much as earlier elections allowed voters to vote 
“against all.” There were some votes for each party in each region. Basic 
statistics are in Table 1a. The analysis first tested an OLS regression model of 
H(P) = log k H(T), which gives an estimate of both the strength of the model 
and an estimate of k as approximately the average number of parties that 
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voters perceived as choices in the election.  
 
Table 1a. Descriptive statistics for the 2007 Duma election. 
 
 Turnout H(P) H(T) H(P)/H(T) 
N of cases 85 85 85 85 
Mean 0.66 1.77 0.87 1.99 
Median 0.63 1.93 0.96 2.03 
Std Dev 0.12 0.49 0.20 0.25 
 
 
The test of the model H(P) = log k H(T) has a potential shortcoming in that it 
offers little opportunity to examine alternative hypotheses. For example, if the 
true relationship is not parabolic or the maximum is not at turnout 50%, the 
analysis would not detect that directly. So to complement the first analysis, 
and provide a way to check for alternatives, H(P) also was regressed on a 
parabolic (quadratic) model of turnout, that is, H(P) = a
0
 + a
1
 t + a
2
 t2. The 
location of  the maximum of this model, if it fits, can be estimated as t
max
 = 
-a
1
/(2 a
2
). For this model, a bootstrap procedure [18] was used to estimate a 
95% confidence interval (CI) for the location of the maximum, which would be 
very difficult calculate analytically. The regression model was re-estimated 
1,000 times, randomly choosing 85 data points with replacement from the 
original data set. The maxima were calculated and ranked from least to 
greatest and the 25th and 975th values define the confidence interval. Standard 
errors of the coefficients were corrected to compensate for heteroscadacity. 
Analysis was done with Systat. 
 
Presidential election of 2008. This analysis was based on 83 regions, having 
deleted two that represented voters outside the Russian borders. Four parties 
were included in the calculation of the party entropy, and analysis followed the 
same procedures as with the 2007 election data. Basic statistics are in Table 
1b. 
 
Table 1b. Descriptive statistics for the 2008 Presidential election. 
 
 Turnout H(P) H(T) H(P)/H(T) 
N of cases* 83 83 83 83 
Mean 0.70 1.17 0.84 1.42 
Median 0.68 1.26 0.90 1.40 
Std Dev 0.10 0.24 0.17 0.19 
*Statistics for voters outside Russia were excluded.  
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Results 
 
The first model tested, the theoretically derived model, (Table 2) fits very well 
in both elections with R2 equal to 0.86 in 2007 and 0.72 in 2008. The estimate 
of log k, an approximate average number of political parties perceived by the 
voters, was 2.04 in 2007 and 1.40 in 2008. The estimate of log k = 2.04 (95% 
CI is 1.99 -2.08) is virtually the same as found by taking the average of 
H(P)/H(T) over the cases. The average ratio is 1.99 (95% CI is 1.94 to 2.05). 
Since log 4 = 2 corresponds exactly to a four-choice situation, one can infer 
that the 2007 election was to most voters, on average, a four-party contest. In 
other words, the parliamentary election looks statistically more like a 
four-party contest than an 11-party contest from a conformity perspective. 
This corresponds well to the actual results of the election wherein, because of  
the 7% threshold, only four parties won seats and together amassed 92% of 
the total vote. For 2008, the estimate of log k = 1.40 is below 1.58, the 
predicted value for three parties. One can convert this to a number of parties 
by raising 2 to the 1.40 power; 21.40=2.6 suggesting the 2008 election was 
perceived as a two-choice or three-choice contest by most voters. Sell also 
Figures 2 and 3. 
 
 
Table 2. Regression coefficient for the equation H(P) = log k H(T). 
 
Election log k (std error)  k parties R2 
2007 2.04 (0.02) 4.1 0.86 
2008  1.40 (0.01) 2.6 0.72 
Notes: k = 2^log k; standard errors are corrected for heteroscadacity; p < 0.00001  
The parabolic regression models (Table 3, Figures 2 and 3) have virtually the 
same strength of fit as the first models when measured by R2—0.88 for 2007 
and 0.74  for 2008. The estimated coefficients a
0
 are not statistically different 
from zero, failing to reject a difference at p< .05; so the parabolic curves 
approximately intersect the origin as predicted by the hypothesis. In 2007 the 
fitted curve equals 0.09 at t = 1, close to the predicted zero (Figure 2); but the 
difference at t = 1 is greater for 2008.  
 
The parabolic maxima in 2007 and 2008 are estimated at turnouts 49.2% 
(36% - 56% CI) and 59.5% (52% - 63% CI), respectively. Neither regression 
is sufficiently different from the predicted model to cause us to consider an 
alternative theory to the conformity model.  
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Table 3. Regression coefficients for the model H(P) = a
0
 +a
1
 t + a
2
 t2 
 
Election a
0
 
(std 
err) 
a
1
 
(std 
err) 
a
2
 
(std 
err) 
R2 parabolic 
maximum 
bootstrap 95% 
confidence 
interval for 
parabolic 
maximum 
2007 
 
0.22 
(0.68) 
7.64 
(1.85) 
-7.77 
(1.20) 
0.88 0.492 0.36 0.56 
2008   -1.00 
(0.55) 
7.81 
(1.55) 
-6.56 
(1.06) 
0.74 0.595 0.52 0.63 
 
Note: standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for heteroscadacity; p < 0.00001 
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After the 2007 election many observers questioned the election procedures in 
several areas that had the highest turnouts and where almost everyone 
apparently voted for the same party. In fact, there are 6 regions that are 
outliers on the turnout scale having turnouts over 90% (Dagestan, 
Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkssia, Mordovia, and 
Chechnya.) These same regions also had very high turnouts in 2008. One can 
characterize them as being on the geographical fringes of Russia and having 
relatively large minority ethnic populations. To check on the influence of these 
cases, which fit the predicted model well, the analysis for 2007 was redone 
excluding these regions. The result was again that the model H(P) = 2.04  H(T) 
fits the data very well, just as it did with those regions included. R2 is reduced 
to 65%, however, as must be anticipated when the range of turnout is limited. 
The 2008 models were also checked excluding regions with turnout over 90%. 
Results were very similar to the earlier model but again with R2 reduced. The 
model estimate is H(P) = 1.40 H(T) at R2 = 52%. Parabolic models also echo 
the previous results. So one can infer that although the highest turnout regions 
have a substantial influence on the strength of fit of the regression models, and 
are at the extreme of Russian voting participation, they are not exceptions to 
the predicted relationship between turnout and party entropy nor do they 
significantly influence model predictions.  
 
Unexplained variation and prediction errors in the analysis can arise when 
some voters vote for reasons unrelated to conformity. Another source of error 
in the models is when people who are prone to conform mistakenly estimate 
the relative frequencies of other voters’ choices. Any irregularities in voting 
procedures will also affect the goodness of fit, although isolated local voting 
problems will have less impact on the results here, which use regional data. 
Errors in the calculation of voter turnout because of ballot over counting, or 
inaccurate estimates of the voting age population and the number of eligible 
voters (the electorate) will further bias the results and, specifically, the 
estimate of the location of the parabolic maximum. 
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Discussion 
  
All the evidence points to the conclusion that both elections fit the theoretically 
predicted relationship between party entropy and turnout that is diagnostic of 
the effect of social conformity on voting. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of 
predictive modeling, there is no appreciable difference between the empirical 
parabolic model and the more constrained, theoretically derived model H(P) = 
log k H(T). Thus one can reject alternatives to the theoretical model that might 
involve a large shift in location of the maximum of the curve or have a 
distinctly different shape. The correspondence of the two models also attests 
to the strength of the observed relationship between party entropy and 
turnout and, thus, the strength of conformity spillover from the turnout choice 
to the party choice. The only parameter allowed to vary in the more 
constrained model for the Duma election was the number of parties, which was 
estimated to be 4—a number in agreement with the final allocation of seats in 
the Duma and the great majority of votes. The presidential election was 
midway between a two-party election and a three-party election. Considering 
both elections, one can say that most voters made decisions as if the number 
of parties were between 2 and 4.  
 
The estimated number of parties agrees with the number people would prefer, 
as reported in opinion polls, though not all voters prefer the same number of 
choices. One can compare the estimated number of parties with surveys about 
how people think of the party system. In 2007, for example, a large majority 
(68%) saw a need for only one to three large parties. This is from a survey by 
Levada Center in Moscow that asked the following question:  
 
Q17-t. How many political parties does Russia need now? (Percentage in agreement) 
 
 Apr 04 Sept 04 Oct 05 July 06 Apr 07 Oct 07 
One strong 
ruling party 
34 34 38 32 30 28 
2 or 3 big 
parties 
41 44 39 42 46 40 
Many small 
parties 
 8  6  4  5  7  9 
No need for 
any parties 
 7  6  7  7  6  7 
Don’t know 11  9 12 14 13 17 
 
Source: Levada Center, nationwide surveys, 2004-2007.  
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The results of the analysis are in line with models estimated for elections in the 
1990s, but goodness of fit of the models has also increased so that the effect 
of conformity is now more pronounced. The party system has evolved, 
however. The fragmentation of the party system has substantially decreased, 
as the smallest parties now get smaller shares of the vote. This has led to a 
large decrease in average party entropy from the 1990s. Some regions have 
also increased their turnout substantially over earlier elections, as described 
above. To see this, compare Figures 2 and 3 with Figure 4, which shows the 
corresponding regional data for the Duma election in 1999 (to party lists). As 
in 2007, there were up to 11 party choices in the 1999 election, but in 1999 the 
number depends on the region. For the parabolic regression model, R2  = 0.36 
(N =222 with two outliers removed, p< .0001) [2]; and the regression of the 
other model yields H(P) = 2.73 H(T) (R2 = 0.29, estimated k = 6.6 parties, p 
< .0001). Observe that in 1999 many regions had party entropy levels near 
the psychological limit of about 3 bits, which is rare and not likely to be 
sustainable in a society. These extreme entropy levels were characteristic of 
parliamentary elections in the 1990s. In sum, the party system has become a 
more normal party system over the last decade, with a number of major 
parties in closer agreement with voters’ preferences and perceptions, and at a 
more normal party entropy level. It appears that Putin succeeded in reducing 
the number of political parties, practically speaking.  
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Were the 2007 and 2008 elections less fair or less democratic than earlier 
elections? Because of President Putin’s changes to the party system, the 
apparent suppression of some parties, government control of the media, and 
reports of voting irregularities, many observers have questioned the fairness 
of the 2007 election [18]. Other research argues against this, however [19]. 
Fewer concerns were raised about the presidential election. One might ask 
whether this research can address the question of fairness. From the 
perspective of this analysis, the latest elections do not appear to have been 
manipulated in a way that lessened the impact of social conformity or replaced 
its force by other motivations to vote. Although voter fraud has been especially 
suspect in the highest turnout regions, they fit the same predicted model as 
other regions. In fact, the strength of the models, and for some regions the 
very high levels of turnout, now show a considerably stronger effect of 
conformity in 2007 and 2008 than in earlier elections. But the 2007 and 2008 
elections continue the patterns seen in earlier elections; they are not unusual 
or suspect. Furthermore, the 2007 and 2008 elections show very similar 
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results in the strength of fit of the models to each other, so there would be little 
reason to see 2007 as less fair than 2008. Indeed the exceptional degree of fit 
of the models in 2007 and 2008 would weigh against any other substantial 
voting factors in these elections. The heightened conformity now in evidence in 
Russia, however, suggests that one can expect to see increasing social 
pressure in voting as well as in other dimensions of social behavior, especially 
in regions with the highest turnout levels. Heightened social pressure might be 
perceived by observers as undue influence on voting behavior, but that does 
not necessarily imply fraud.  
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